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1. Introduction
The McKell Institute is an independent, 
not-for-profit public policy institute 
dedicated to developing practical 
policy ideas and contributing  
to public debate.
The McKell Institute’s key areas of activity include producing policy research papers,  
hosting policy roundtable discussions and organising public lectures and debates.
The McKell Institute takes its name from New South Wales’ wartime Premier and  
Governor–General of Australia, William McKell. 
William McKell made a powerful contribution to both New South Wales and Australian 
society through progressive social, economic and environmental reforms.
For more information phone (02) 9113 0940 or visit www.mckellinstitute.org.au
About the  
McKell Institute
The opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
represent the views of the McKell Institute’s members, affiliates,  
individual board members or research committee members.  
Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
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Foreword
Australia’s superannuation system has transformed 
the way Australians think about their retirement. 
But as the size of the funds increase there is 
additional scrutiny surrounding the governance 
structures in place to administer the savings of 
members. 
The new Federal Government has kick-started the 
debate with its discussion paper: Better regulation 
and governance, enhanced transparency and 
improved competition in superannuation. It has 
been simultaneously welcomed and condemned, 
and while its motivations have been questioned 
there is now more than ever a focus on the 
governance on these massive pools of savings. 
The Government’s discussion paper has followed 
from the 2010 Super System Review (also 
known as the Cooper Inquiry) that recommended 
that industry superannuation funds alter their 
representative board structure to appoint a 
proportion of independent directors to all industry 
superannuation funds. This report examines the 
relationship between the governance structures 
and their performance in order to evaluate the 
efficacy of the Cooper Inquiry recommendations.
While all parties agree that good governance in 
superannuation is critical to ensuring the integrity of 
the system the methods by which this is achieved 
are hotly disputed. 
The McKell Institute’s report into the administration 
of industry super-funds is as timely as it is 
comprehensive. 
Drawing on 25 years of data, the report examines 
the governance structures and performance of 
industry superannuation funds in comparison to 
“Superannuation is now an accumulation of just on  
$1 trillion in national terms. Let me repeat that:  
$1 trillion for just the twenty million of us. That pool of 
savings has transformed the Australian capital markets 
and has dramatically reduced the cost of capital in 
Australia. Even at 9 percentage points, the pool when fully 
mature should top out at 200 per cent of GDP.  
A remarkable number.”
Paul Keating. The Story of Modern Superannuation - 31 October 2007
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other funds in both the Australian and international 
market. 
The report examines the rich statistical evidence, 
empirical data and existing research and 
compares this data against the objectives of the 
funds; primarily to act in the best interest of its 
members and maximize the retirement incomes 
of Australians. It concludes that the existing 
representative structure of industry funds is the 
model that most closely satisfies these objectives 
and should not be altered. 
Proponents of the Federal Government’s 
discussion paper have argued that the involvement 
of employer groups and trade unions in the 
governance of these funds were born of a time of 
high levels of regulation and industry centralisation. 
They argue that as the structure of the economy 
has changed so to should the administration 
models of the superannuation sector. 
However, as this report shows, all the available 
evidence shows a strong relationship between 
not-for-profit representative governance and higher 
levels of returns for members. The research uses 
actual crediting rates into fund members accounts 
over 25 years to show that governance models are 
at the heart of the higher performance of not-for-
profit funds. 
Although the existing system is the best suited to 
achieving its objectives, this report nevertheless 
recognises that there is still potential for 
improvement. The authors have suggested a range 
of measures including increased risk management 
systems, increased training and expertise, and 
a renewed governance culture that focuses on 
honesty amongst board directors and trustees.
We hope that the findings of this report reaches 
its intended audience and that its messages are 
understood. Furthermore, we hope that the Federal 
Government holds off on mandating reform in this 
area without providing strong evidence in favour of 
such a change. The trillions dollars of Australian’s 
retirement savings are far too important to our 
future to jeopardise with ideological dogma.
The Hon John Watkins
CHAIR,  
MCKELL INSTITUTE 
Sam Crosby
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
MCKELL INSTITUTE
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This report examines the governance structures 
and performance of representative trustee 
superannuation funds in comparison to other 
superannuation funds in the Australian and 
international market. In 2010 the Super System 
Review (Cooper Inquiry) recommended that 
industry superannuation funds alter the current 
representative board structure to appoint a 
proportion of independent directors to all industry 
superannuation funds. Through a comprehensive 
review of published research together with an 
analysis of statistical data on both for-profit 
and not-for-profit superannuation funds, this 
report examines the relationship between their 
governance structures and performance in order 
to evaluate the efficacy of the Cooper Inquiry 
recommendations. 
The report concludes that evidence does not 
support the view that mandating independent 
directors on not-for-profit superannuation funds 
would improve fund performance. Instead, 
research and empirical data suggests strongly that 
the representative trustee governance structure of 
industry and other not-for-profit funds is actually 
the model that most closely satisfies the objectives 
of meeting the best interests of members and 
maximising retirement incomes for Australians. 
The report demonstrates the following:
 Most superannuation in Australia is provided 
through trusts, and the common law and 
statutory law pertaining to trusts imposes 
higher standards of conduct on trustee 
directors than directors of other models of 
organisations;
 Academic research investigating whether 
having independent directors on corporate 
boards delivers improved performance in 
the form of higher returns is equivocal: but 
independence is clearly not a panacea for 
corporate governance.
 The overriding challenge of corporate 
governance is to align the interests of the 
corporate board and management as 
closely as possible to those of shareholders; 
representation is the most powerful 
mechanism for aligning the interests of boards 
and shareholders.
 WIth superannuation funds, the not-for-
profit representative trustee model has 
outperformed its for-profit appointed trustee 
competitors on virtually every important criteria 
of superannuation performance over a long 
period.
 The representative governance model in 
superannuation has promoted higher levels 
of diversity amongst trustees, more effectively 
minimises conflicts and interest and generates 
higher net returns for fund members.
Our report raises the question: when a system is 
working better than the alternative, why tamper 
with it? Nonetheless in the pursuit of continuous 
improvement, we recommend that the following 
three strategies may contribute to improved 
performance for all superannuation funds:
 Increased competence of directors through 
ongoing training and experience;
 A renewed focus on a culture of ‘honesty’  
in governance; and
 An emphasis on building robust risk 
management systems.
Executive summary
The success of representative governance on superannuation boards
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Those results are also presented in the context 
of existing Australian and international empirical 
evidence. The central concern of this report is 
with the governance and performance of default 
and balanced superannuation funds in Australia, 
where the vast bulk of fund members have their 
superannuation savings. The analysis is timely, 
given debate surrounding the Cooper Review’s 
(2010) recommendations that industry boards 
alter their current representative board structure 
in order to appoint independent directors and, 
more recently, the release of the Commonwealth 
Government’s Discussion Paper (2013) on 
regulation and governance of the superannuation 
system. It is also timely because of debate 
surrounding which funds and on what terms funds 
are permitted to have access to default fund 
status in company and industry wide industrial 
agreements and instruments. A key focus of this 
report is on whether recommendations made by 
the Cooper Inquiry in relation to board structure 
and composition would improve the performance 
and governance of industry superannuation funds. 
1.1 History and coverage of 
superannuation entitlements 
in Australia
Superannuation is an industry that, along with 
the age pension and voluntary savings, forms the 
so-called ‘three pillars’ of Australia’s retirement 
system. Accordingly, it is charged with contributing 
significantly to the retirement financing of working 
Australians and to the government’s overall goals 
for improving social wellbeing more broadly.
Superannuation as a form of retirement savings 
has existed since before federation. Yet by 1974, 
when the Australian Bureau of Statistics conducted 
its first national survey of coverage, only 32% of 
the workforce was covered by superannuation, 
the majority of whom were in the public sector, 
and the remainder in company-specific plans. 
In 1976, the Hancock Inquiry which the Whitlam 
Labor government had established in 1973 
recommended a partly contributory pension system 
with an earnings-related supplement. However, in 
1979, the Fraser Coalition government rejected the 
Hancock recommendations. Nonetheless, from 
the late 1970s, superannuation started to become 
more widely available through industrial awards and 
agreements.
The history of institutionalised employee 
superannuation and Industry Super Funds dates 
from the mid-1980s, when, as part of its national 
wage claim under the Accord, the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions sought a three percent 
employer superannuation contribution to be paid 
into an industry fund. The government supported 
the claim, and in February 1986, the Commission 
decided that it would approve industrial agreements 
that provided for contributions of up to three 
percent to approved superannuation funds. 
In the following years, superannuation coverage 
increased from 40 per cent to 79 per cent of 
employees. Yet, by 1991, nearly one-third of private 
sector employees did not have superannuation 
coverage. As well, enforcing compliance for award-
based employees through the Industrial Relations 
Commission had proved difficult. In 1992 the 
Keating government introduced a Superannuation 
1 Introduction
This report presents the results of research on the relationship between 
fund performance and governance structures of superannuation funds 
in the Australian market. 
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Guarantee, which required employers to make tax-
deductible superannuation contributions on behalf 
of their employees at the rate of three percent of 
salary. Higher levels of contribution were phased 
in over the next decade, such that by 2002/3 
employers’ superannuation contributions had 
grown to nine percent of salary.
Until 2005, however, the superannuation guarantee 
legislation did not give employees an explicit 
choice of super fund. For employees covered 
by awards, the award generally nominated an 
industry fund. Otherwise, employers were free to 
pay the super into any fund they chose. In 2005, 
legislation gave employees a choice of super 
fund and required trustees to transfer a member’s 
accumulated benefits to another fund on request 
of the member. Since then legislative changes 
have made numerous modifications to the system 
including abolishing tax on lump sum payments 
paid to members over sixty, and introducing 
a co-contribution scheme, a government co-
contribution matching rate and concessional 
contributions. Finally, in 2014, the MySuper scheme 
was introduced. This requires employers to make 
superannuation contributions to a MySuper 
accredited super scheme, unless employees 
choose alternative funds.
Public support for ‘super’ is overwhelming. A 
2013 survey conducted by the Financial Services 
Council and ING Direct (FSC/ING) reported that 89 
per cent of Australians support superannuation, 
and 83 per cent further supported increasing the 
compulsory contribution rate to 12 per cent. The 
reason for this near-universal support is clear – 
Australians understand the necessity of having 
a decent income stream for their retirement, and 
superannuation provides a market-based means of 
wealth creation to reach this goal.
1.2 Regulation of 
superannuation
The superannuation industry now has considerable 
funds under management, with total assets valued 
at $1.62 trillion at the end of the 2012/13 financial 
year, having increased by a sector average of 15.7 
per cent during the year to 30 June 2013. These 
savings are set to increase substantially in coming 
decades, with the 2010 Super System Review 
(‘Cooper Review’) estimating that these collective 
savings will be valued at $6.1 trillion by 2035. Not 
surprisingly, the regulation and governance of this 
industry is attracting considerable government, 
industry and scholarly attention.
As we discuss later in the Report, some funds 
are owned by banks, insurance companies or 
other financial institutions and operate as profit-
making entities (and are known as retail funds). 
Some are owned by individuals (self-managed 
superannuation funds or SMSFs). Others, in the 
not-for-profit sector, such as corporate, public 
sector and industry funds were created by mutual 
agreement between employer and employee 
bodies and established in the form of trusts to 
manage members’ retirement savings. Most 
superannuation in Australia is provided through a 
trust structure. This trust structure is overlaid with 
substantial statutory regulation.
1.2.1 Trust structure and duties
The legal doctrine of trusts has existed for 
centuries within the common law. The regulation 
of trusts is established through trust law, trust 
deeds and federal, state and territory legislation. 
As superannuation funds operate with a trust 
structure, the duties and obligations of directors are 
different than under other models of organisation 
– ‘trustees have generally been held to a higher 
standard of conduct than is required of corporate 
directors or parties to a contract’. Governments 
have attempted to codify fiduciary obligations and 
the duties of trustee directors: each state and 
territory has its own trustee legislation and the 
national SIS Act also requires the governing rules 
of registrable superannuation entities to contain 
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covenants which specify the duties of the trustee. 
In addition, because most superannuation trusts 
are corporate trustees, their directors are also 
regulated by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
In addition, as Scott Donald notes trust law 
interacts not only with a complex regulatory 
environment and public expectations to produce 
what he terms a multi-layered conception of the 
trustee. As Donald suggests:
There is a vast jurisprudence 
dedicated to outlining what is expected 
of those who bear the title of trustee 
or who owe fiduciary obligations. 
But the words also carry a deep 
meaning in lay discourse. They 
imply a selfless, protective stance 
and carry a somewhat paternal (or 
perhaps avuncular) tenor… It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that the 
rhetoric surrounding trusteeship is 
one of the factors that inspire public 
confidence in the superannuation 
system as a whole.
Under the Corporations Act 2001, directors are 
bound by the duties provided in sections 181-183, 
supplemented by disclosure duties in sections 
191-196. These include such duties as the duty 
to act bona fide in the company’s interests, to use 
powers for proper purposes, to avoid actual and 
potential conflicts of interest, and to use the care 
and diligence of a reasonable person subject to the 
business judgement rule. 
Under state and territory trustee law, trustees 
are bound to act with prudence. Thus under the 
Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), for instance, a trustee 
must, in exercising a power of investment, ‘exercise 
the care, diligence and skill that a prudent person 
would exercise in managing the affairs of other 
persons’ (s14A). 
The SIS Act imposes on Superannuation fund 
trustees stronger duties than these other statutory 
instruments in some respects. These are contained 
in the covenants that sections 52 and 52A of the 
SIS Act require the governing rules of the trust to 
include. 
Thus superannuation trustees must: 
 ensure that their fund is maintained solely for 
the provision of benefits to members (SIS Act, 
s62);
 must exercise their powers in the best interest 
of those members (s52);
 act honestly in all matters concerning the entity 
(s52(2)(a)); and
 conflicts must be resolved in favour of fund 
members, even if, for the trustee director, this 
duty comes into conflict with their obligations 
to any other person. (s52(2)(d))
In addition to the ordinary duties of trustees 
and directors, therefore, trustee directors of 
superannuation funds have an overarching duty to 
the fund’s members. This is an additional level of 
responsibility which aims to ensure that the trustee 
director’s decisions cannot be driven by the trustee 
entity, their nominating body or another’s wishes. 
1.2.2 Statutory regulation
As noted above, superannuation trustees are also 
regulated by corporations law, financial services 
law, state and territory trustee law and specific 
superannuation industry statutes. Since the mid-
1980s there has been considerable legislative 
activity in terms of the specific regulation of 
superannuation funds, particularly at national level. 
From 1987, the Occupational Superannuation 
Standards Act (Cth) (OSSA) prescribed operating 
standards for superannuation funds. Seven years 
later, the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 
1994 (Cth (the SIS Act) replaced OSSA. The SIS 
Act sets out the basic duties, responsibilities and 
powers of trustees and also requirements in relation 
to disclosure, reporting, the roles of auditors and 
actuaries, and the enforcement powers of the 
Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC). 
The SIS legislation has been amended repeatedly 
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since 1994 to give effect to the Commonwealth 
Government’s retirement policies.
Following a government inquiry into Australia’s 
financial system in 1996-7, the Commonwealth 
government established the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) to supervise the 
banking, insurance and superannuation sectors 
of the financial services industry, and accordingly 
also take over the functions of the ISC. The SIS 
provisions relating to disclosure and market 
conduct became the responsibility of the newly 
established Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC). Both APRA and ASIC also 
provide guidance on interpretation of relevant laws 
and guidelines to complement trustees’ obligations 
which are to be read alongside relevant statutory 
regulations.
In 2001, the Commonwealth government released 
an Issues Paper, Options for Improving the Safety 
of Superannuation. Many of its recommendations 
were subsequently implemented through the 
Superannuation Safety Amendment Act 2004 
(Cth). The key changes included a requirement 
that trustees of Superannuation funds be licensed 
by APRA, and that trusts meet a mandatory risk 
management framework and comply with new 
operating standards in relation to fitness, propriety, 
adequacy of resources and outsourcing.
1.2.3 Recent interest in regulatory 
change 
On 29 May 2009, the national government 
announced a review into the governance, 
efficiency, structure and operation of Australia’s 
superannuation system to be chaired by 
Jeremy Cooper. After the release of three 
preliminary papers, the Cooper Review 
published the final report in June 2010. 
The Review’s terms of reference were that its work 
must be conducted around the concepts of the 
best interests of the member and the maximising 
of retirement incomes for Australians. While the 
Cooper Review made numerous recommendations 
for change to the superannuation system, it is the 
recommendations in relation to trustee governance 
in Chapter 2 of the Final Report that are most 
pertinent to this report. 
In particular, the Cooper Review called for the 
appointment of a greater proportion of independent 
directors on the trust boards of superannuation 
funds. Specifically, the report recommended:
the SIS Act should be amended so that if a trustee 
board does not have equal representation, the 
trustee must have a majority of ‘non-associated’ 
trustee directors (Rec 2.6);
For those boards that have equal representation 
because their company constitutions or other 
binding arrangements so require, the SIS Act 
should be amended so that no less than one-third 
of the total number of member representative 
trustee-directors must be non-associated and 
no less than one-third of employer representative 
trustee-directors must be non-associated (Rec 2.7).
The Cooper Review defined a non-associated 
trustee as a trustee or director who: 
is free of connections to, or associations with, 
employer sponsors, the appointor (other than by 
reason of the appointment itself), entities related 
to the trustee, employer groups, unions, service 
providers and should not be current or former 
executives of the fund of a related entity.
We discuss later in this report how this concept of 
a non-associated trustee is different than definitions 
of independence under the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles and the SIS Act. The issues 
of equal representation and independence form a 
crucial part of our analysis.
In the superannuation industry, there is no 
statutory requirement that a certain proportion of 
directors be independent. The SIS Act requires 
that a corporate trustee for a standard employer-
sponsored fund must consist of equal numbers 
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of employer and member representatives, but 
is silent on independent directorships. Similarly, 
outside the superannuation industry, while the ASX 
recommends that a majority of the board of a listed 
entity should consist of independent directors, 
there is no legal requirement for this. APRA requires 
that boards of banking and insurance entities 
have a majority of independent members and 
an independent chair. For managed investment 
schemes, the Corporations Act (2001) requires a 
compliance committee be established if less than 
half the directors are external (s601JB). 
Significantly, however, the Australian Government 
Discussion Paper on the superannuation 
governance and regulation released in November 
2013 maintains that the number of independent 
directors is a threshold issue. Suggesting that 
a prescribed minimum number of independent 
directors is the federal government’s favoured 
response in seeking to introduce best practice 
governance, the Discussion paper has requested 
stakeholders to submit views on an appropriate 
proportion of independent directors for 
superannuation boards.
1.3  Organisation of this report
In order to examine whether the Cooper 
recommendations on board constitution 
would improve the performance of industry 
superannuation funds, this report analyses models 
of governance and representation in the industry, 
and compares the governance and performance 
of industry funds with other models. While focusing 
on Australia’s superannuation industry, the 
analysis also draws on international evidence and 
analysis on the governance and performance of 
superannuation and occupational pension funds. 
Finally, we also make recommendations for industry 
superannuation in light of this analysis.  
The structure of the report is as follows. 
Section 2 identifies the key attributes of the 
Australian superannuation sector, including those 
that make it different from other financial markets, 
both in the way participants are engaged in the 
industry, and how it is structured and operates. We 
show that these distinguishing features inevitably 
mean that market governance (that is competition 
around price and performance) is not a strong 
mechanism, and that prospects for it becoming so 
are similarly weak. This means that internal fund 
governance (non-market, internal structures and 
processes that discipline the fund’s management 
to act in the best interests of its members) is a 
much more critical area for ensuring fund members 
interests are advanced and protected.
Section 3 then analyses evidence of the impact of 
independence in research-based corporate and 
pension fund governance literature, and critiques 
claims that it can adequately address issues of 
diversity, trustee objectivity and conflicts of interest 
in the superannuation industry. Despite popular 
belief that a blanket provision of independent 
directors on superannuation trustee boards will 
strengthen the superannuation system, economic 
and legal theory does not support the claim that 
greater independence leads to improved fund 
performance. Importantly, the evidence in favour of 
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increased independence is not only equivocal, but 
findings suggest that mandated independence risks 
either acting as a ‘band aid’ solution to the above 
issues if its definition is left too broad, or could 
result in a lack of available trustees if the definition 
is overly restrictive.
Instead, the most important characteristic feature 
of corporate governance is not independence, 
but representation. Representative governance 
(or what in the US has been termed ‘corporate 
Jacksonianism’) is seen widely as the most 
important way that corporate governance 
structures attempt to resolve the collective 
action problem of ensuring corporations act in 
the interests of diverse groups of shareholders/
stakeholder. By contrast, the main promise of 
independence is better protection of minority 
interests, with negligible impact on the overarching 
problem of ensuring organisations perform in the 
interests of all owners/beneficiaries.
There are two basic models of superannuation fund 
governance in Australia – a representative trustee, 
not-for-profit model, and a for-profit, appointed 
trustee model. Section 4 demonstrates that these 
are not simply descriptive or statistical categories. 
They represent two different fund types in terms 
of governance structures and behaviours. It is 
therefore reasonable and relevant to use these 
categories to examine the relationship between 
governance models and performance. We review 
the statistical evidence on fund performance 
and governance models, and conclude that the 
representative not-for-profit governance model 
has consistently and significantly outperformed its 
for-profit counterparts in generating higher returns 
for the benefit of fund members, and over a long 
period. The effects of the differential performance 
for the retirement living standards, and potential 
retirement age, of fund members are substantial.  
There is considerable debate about the 
effectiveness of independence as a panacea 
for the problems of board governance in the 
corporate sector. We conclude that any reforms 
to superannuation governance problems should 
be based on the best available evidence, and this 
evidence suggests that the most important factors 
leading to strong performance are representative 
governance structures and processes.
Section 5 considers what can be done to improve 
governance in practice. This includes a discussion 
of several matters which scholarly and stakeholder 
research suggests have a substantial impact on 
super fund performance and yet have gained little 
traction in policy debates to date. These include 
the competence of directors, board cultures and 
insufficient attention to implementing robust risk 
management systems. But the open question 
for policy makers of this research is whether in a 
mandatory defined contribution system, in which 
so many risks are now borne by fund members 
themselves, any default (or what are being re-
branded MySuper) superannuation funds should 
be able to gain access to member contributions 
without a representative governance structure in 
place. The section and the report concludes with 
recommendations for improvements in these areas. 
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One direct consequence of recognising this fact 
is that the government has a much greater and 
more direct interest in the performance of the 
industry than it does in other areas of the market. 
In particular, Australia’s mandatory contribution 
system means that superannuation is of more than 
just prudential interest to the Federal Government. 
However, superannuation has a number of unique 
characteristics that set it apart from other areas of 
finance, creating distinct challenges when reform 
is sought.
2.1  An overview of 
superannuation  
governance systems
Corporate governance literature defines two 
complementary forms of governance mechanism:
 MARKET (OR EXTERNAL) GOVERNANCE: 
The discipline exerted by market processes 
rewards better performing financial institutions 
or corporations and penalises poorer 
performers (such as by greater inward fund 
flows or more share purchases, improved 
share price, etc.); and
 NON-MARKET (OR INTERNAL) 
GOVERNANCE: The organisational structure 
and administration of a company or financial 
institution (including board and management 
structures) and how those delegated with 
the job of managing an organisation are 
supervised and held to account.
This report outlines further the different forms 
of governance and their robustness in the 
superannuation industry in the following sub-
section. For now, we wish to note also that there 
are two basic types of non-market governance 
structures in Australian superannuation: 
representative and appointed trustees.
While funds are typically classified into four 
broad types: Retail, Corporate, Public Sector, 
and Industry, two relatively distinct types of fund 
governance have evolved in the occupational 
superannuation industry, based on different 
business, distribution and representation models:
 APPOINTED TRUSTEE (FOR PROFIT) 
MODEL: Funds run and administered by 
financial institutions, which have a high sales 
and distribution component, where fund 
boards are made up of appointed trustee 
directors; and
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNANCE (NOT-
FOR-PROFIT) MODEL: Funds in which 
distribution is largely at or through the 
workplace, and with both member and 
employer representation on the fund board.
Retail funds are typically governed using an 
appointed trustee governance model, with 
Corporate, Public Sector, and Industry funds 
generally operating under representative 
governance structures. Although many of the 
latter three fund types are non-public offer funds, 
available only to certain employees or individuals, 
a majority of Industry funds have entered the 
public offer competitive arena occupied by Retail 
2. Superannuation and  
its unique challenges
With total assets valued at $1.62 trillion at the end of the 2012/13 financial 
year, Australia’s superannuation industry is now the largest in the world.
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funds. As of 2013 nearly 70 per cent of Industry 
funds are public offer funds, placing the majority 
of Industry funds in direct competition with their 
Retail counterparts for new members (as well as 
existing members within these funds) and their 
retirement savings.
2.2  The importance of 
internal governance for 
superannuation
In recent years superannuation fund regulatory 
policy has placed increased emphasis on market 
governance. In particular, fund regulation has 
attempted to ensure greater competitive discipline 
of private fund managers by freeing up restrictions 
on fund flows and increasing transparency around 
price and performance, allowing fund members 
to switch funds to different investment options 
and to different funds. The expectation here is 
that informed and active fund members will act to 
reward better performing funds or fund options and 
penalise poorer performers.
It is indeed central to the viability of any market-
based system of fund governance that fund flows 
plays a strong disciplining role on fund manager 
performance. As Navone notes:
…competition among funds to attract 
new capital is one of the most powerful 
tools available to solve the agency 
problem that arises between fund 
managers and investors.
However, the question for Australia’s regulatory 
framework is whether fund flows are performance-
seeking enough to bridge the gap between the 
large and complex financial institutions managing 
the funds and the fund members, who since 1992 
have been required to hand over a proportion of 
their incomes to funds and expect to have their 
funds managed wisely and in their best interests.
Unfortunately, widespread public support for 
superannuation has not translated into widespread 
understanding by Australians of their retirement 
investments. A 2008 study found that 80 per cent 
of fund members felt they knew very little about 
their super, while the FSC/ING survey found that 
a majority of Australians were confused by the 
superannuation system and were thus content to 
let their superannuation “look after itself”. Instead, 
most Australians are content to let others deal 
with their superannuation. Surveys have found that 
around 84 per cent of superannuation products 
obtained over the past five year were done so 
through an individual’s employer, while 74 per cent 
of Australians simply accepted their employer’s 
default fund or recommendation, putting their super 
“out of sight, out of mind”.
The compulsory, universal nature of superannuation 
appears to be one reason most Australian fund 
members can be described as ‘reluctant investors’ 
(or more aptly perhaps ‘conscripted investors’), if 
indeed they consider themselves as ‘investors’ at 
all. These characteristics mean that in many ways 
superannuation is akin to a public-private partnership 
for the delivery of part of the government’s retirement 
policy. In a very real sense, the government 
effectively acts as a co-investor or partner in the 
superannuation industry, and has a direct interest 
in and responsibility for industry performance that it 
does not have in voluntary market sectors.
Members’ disengagement with their 
superannuation funds may also be a consequence 
of a majority of Australians who, according to the 
ABS, lack the financial literacy skills necessary to 
manage their finances. According to the Cooper 
Review, these deficiencies mean that many 
Australians struggle to understand job applications 
and payroll forms, leaving them unable to meet the 
demands of Australia’s knowledge-based economy. 
However, in a compulsory system substantial 
member disengagement may be fairly rational  due 
to the system’s complexity, confusing nature and 
long-term outcomes. From the evidence above, 
it appears that most fund members believe that 
compulsion equates to government assuming 
substantial responsibility for superintending the 
institutions that get access to their compulsory 
savings, and under what terms.
20 T H E  M C K E L L  I N S T I T U T E
In such circumstances, superannuation cannot 
reasonably be viewed as a typical private 
market populated by active, rational and 
informed investors, a key assumption made by 
previous inquiries into the financial sector. Such 
a challenge was recognised by the Cooper 
Review, which recommended that an approach 
of ‘libertarian paternalism’ be taken in response 
– namely, the creation of MySuper, a basic yet 
robust product system that attempts to meet 
the objective needs of inactive fund members. 
There is, however, a case to be made that having 
made that recognition the Review did not go far 
enough in protecting the reluctant, conscripted 
superannuation participant. Although it set some 
general criteria for access to default status, the 
Review did not deal with issues of fund governance 
in any detailed way, instead leaving it to the 
market and greater transparency to discipline fund 
performance.
The Cooper Review and other empirical evidence 
makes clear that market governance in compulsory 
superannuation is unlikely to provide the sort of 
discipline on funds required to make the industry 
efficient in the near future. In the shadow of 
the poor record of and prospects for market 
governance, non-market governance mechanisms 
such as organisational structure, including the 
type and composition of boards that oversee 
superannuation funds, becomes increasingly 
important.
Accordingly, any reforms that are made to 
non-market governance mechanisms should 
be strongly grounded in evidence about the 
relationship between governance and performance. 
Although provision arguably should be made for 
fund members with the confidence and financial 
acumen needed to actively tailor their investments, 
the focus of any changes to the superannuation 
system must remain with the reluctant investors 
who form the vast majority of beneficiaries of the 
superannuation system. Indeed, as we have argued 
above, the government has a direct interest here 
because, in essence, superannuation funds are 
being contracted to deliver a significant part of 
government retirement policy.
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Alignment rather than independence should be 
the overarching policy goal of any superannuation 
governance reforms.
3.1  Background: Corporate 
boards and independent 
directors
In the sphere of corporate governance, board 
independence is recommended in most if not all 
jurisdictions as a suitable solution to the agency 
problem originally articulated in Berle and Mean’s 
theory of separation of ownership and control 
in the modern corporation. There is a need to 
monitor corporate managers’ behaviour to ensure 
that they act as faithful agents of the shareholder/
owners of the corporation. “Board independence” 
implies that the composition of the board is 
sufficiently independent of management to be able 
to exercise independent oversight of management 
decisions and to ensure that they are consistent 
with shareholder interests. That management will 
have incentives to act in their own self-interest 
rather than that of shareholders is implied, and is 
consistent with the basic assumption of modern 
neoclassical economics, that all economic agents 
are individual utility maximisers. 
Lawrence and Stapledon agree with these 
observations on the purpose of board 
independence for corporations:
It appears that those who advocate 
an increase in the proportion of 
independent directors on company 
boards are implicitly, if not explicitly, 
suggesting that such a development 
would bring about a net reduction in 
agency costs. 
Tricker lists a number of arguments that are put 
forward for appointing independent directors. 
These include suggestions that they provide 
public accountability and credibility, provide 
a counterweight to managerial power, bring 
a diversity of skills and experience and wider 
networks, and provide new perspectives and 
access to relevant external information. 
For Urtiaga and Saez, independent directors 
are expected to also protect the interests of 
minority shareholders and act as an agent of the 
regulator inside the board. These authors report 
that the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)’s statements on board 
independence preclude allowing non-executive 
board members with current or former personal or 
economic links with the company or its executives, 
due to the risk of them being unable to act with 
full independence from management. IOSCO 
argues that independent non-executive board 
members bring two critically important aspects to 
corporate governance: independent judgement and 
protection for minority shareholders.
3. Exploring board 
independence
This paper argues that the key governance problem in superannuation is 
ensuring the alignment of interests and outlook between a board and its  
fund members.
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As an example of the inclusion of board 
independence with corporate governance codes 
and recommendations in the Australian setting, 
Principle 2 of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
2014 (released on 27 March 2014) states that 
the board of a listed entity should have a board 
of an appropriate size, composition, skills and 
commitment to enable it to discharge its duties 
effectively.
 
ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
COUNCIL’S PRINCIPLES OF  
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2014
Principle 2 - Structure  
the board to add value
 RECOMMENDATION 2.1:  
The board of a listed entity should:
(a) have a nomination committee which: 
(1) has at least three members, a majority 
of whom are independent directors; 
and (2) is chaired by an independent 
director, and disclose: (3) the charter of 
the committee; (4) the members of the 
committee; and (5) as at the end of each 
reporting period, the number of times the 
committee met throughout the period 
and the individual attendances of the 
members at those meetings; or
(b) if it does not have a nomination 
committee, disclose that fact and the 
processes it employs to address board 
succession issues and to ensure that 
the board has the appropriate balance 
of skills, knowledge, experience, 
independence and diversity to 
enable it to discharge its duties and 
responsibilities effectively.
 RECOMMENDATION 2.2:  
A listed entity should have and disclose a 
board skills matrix setting out the mix of skills 
and diversity that the board currently has or 
is looking to achieve in its membership.
 RECOMMENDATION 2.3:  
A listed entity should disclose:
(a) the names of the directors considered by 
the board to be independent directors;
(b) if a director has an interest, position, 
association or relationship of the type 
described in Box 2.3 but the board is of 
the opinion that it does not compromise 
the independence of the director, 
the nature of the interest, position, 
association or relationship in question 
and an explanation of why the board is 
of that opinion; and
(c) the length of service of each director.
 RECOMMENDATION 2.4:  
A majority of the board of a listed entity 
should be independent directors.
 RECOMMENDATION 2.5:  
The chair of the board of a listed entity 
should be an independent director and, in 
particular, should not be the same person 
as the CEO of the entity.
 RECOMMENDATION 2.6:  
A listed entity should have a program 
for inducting new directors and provide 
appropriate professional development 
opportunities for directors to develop and 
maintain the skills and knowledge needed 
to perform their role as directors effectively.
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As board independence has been operationalised 
in recent corporate governance recommendations 
and codes, it is applied not only to the overall 
composition of the board, but also to the interests, 
experience and expertise of individual directors. It 
has been extended to mean not only independence 
from management, but also representation 
of the diversity of shareholders, or more 
broadly, corporate stakeholders. Whether such 
recommendations and codes deliver a solution 
to the agency problem is an empirical question, 
the answer to which will vary depending on the 
individual corporate circumstances.
There is a body of academic research that 
has investigated whether having independent 
directors on corporate boards delivers improved 
performance in the form of higher returns. 
Understandably, the results of such research are 
equivocal. Board independence is not aimed at 
improved performance in terms of higher returns 
to shareholders, but rather the prevention of 
systematic underperformance due to managers 
optimising their own utility rather than their 
shareholders. Further, any attempt to measure the 
link between a governance system and corporate 
performance needs firstly to control for all of the 
other factors that affect performance, from factors 
that are more or less under management control, 
such as employees, suppliers and operational 
processes, to those that are not at all under 
their control, such as the state of the economy, 
competition in the industry, changing consumer 
tastes, the weather, and the news!
3.2  Governance of 
superannuation and 
independent boards
The approach applied to corporate governance has 
been also applied to superannuation in Australia. 
In a recent discussion paper on superannuation 
governance from Australian Treasury, it is 
contended that independent directors will increase 
board diversity and reduce material conflicts of 
interest, ultimately maximising benefits to members 
in the future. Assistant Treasurer Senator Arthur 
Sinodinos has claimed that increased levels of 
board independence will ‘empower’ fund members.
However, the applicability of the corporate model 
to the financial sector, and to superannuation in 
particular, has been questioned. 
Given the stronger regulation of trustee directors 
under common law and statutory law than that 
applying to ordinary directors, requirements for 
independence of individual directors, or boards as a 
whole, should be less necessary for superannuation 
trustee directors than for corporate directors. 
The SIS Act defines an ‘independent trustee’ in a 
similar manner to the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles, stipulating that a director cannot be a 
fund member, an employer-sponsor or affiliated 
with one, nor acting in the interests of a trade union 
or employee/employer-sponsor. These definitions 
are in line with international standards, which define 
an independent director as an individual who is free 
of material conflicts of interest, particularly conflicts 
concerning management, that impact upon their 
ability to make decisions.
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3.3  The shortcomings of 
independence in governance
As discussed earlier, the regulation and practice 
of corporate governance places a high value on 
independence. However, academic literature paints 
a more complex and ambiguous picture, with 
research suggesting that having a greater number 
of independent directors on company boards 
does not guarantee the outcomes attributed to 
independent directors. This section looks more 
closely at the arguments against independence in 
governance.
Implementing mandated independence guidelines 
creates a structural test to guide the selection 
of directors. However, independent status (i.e. 
classified as such under statute or a code of 
practice) does not guarantee non-conflicted 
outcomes (i.e. the actual ability of a board to 
exercise objective judgement in the best interests 
of its principals). Although independent outcomes 
may be easier for individuals who do not hold 
material conflicts of interest, it must be emphasised 
that this does not mean that individuals who do 
have such conflicts cannot exercise objective, 
independent judgement. According to Wheeler, 
history tells us unequivocally that the presence of 
independent directors neither guarantees good 
financial performance, nor freedom from scandal.
A number of observers have criticised the use of 
structural tests to encourage independence, noting 
that such confidence in the ability of independence 
to deliver more critical thinking and informed 
discussion is misaligned with the psychological 
literature. Others contend that structural barriers 
alone do not prevent negative influences from 
arising and are unlikely to create the necessary 
conditions for more substantive independence. 
Some, such as Clarke and Dean, reject the notion 
of independence entirely, arguing that by itself the 
concept is ‘virtually useless [and] operationally 
bankrupt’:
It is useless because it doesn’t 
faithfully describe or reinforce how 
essential it is that both directors and 
auditors in going about their tasks 
are extremely well informed, and 
operationally bankrupt because it is, 
at best, functional only as a reactive 
rather than proactive tool, and of 
dubious benefit in any event.
Independence is, in their view, used much too often 
to improve the appearance of integrity on company 
boards or auditors rather than reducing conflicted 
decision making in reality. In fact, the authors 
warn that focusing excessively on appearances 
is likely to give investors unwarranted confidence 
and a false sense of security, increasing the shock 
when companies continue to fall into disrepute or 
insolvency.
This is consistent with the view also supported in 
the fund management sector that independent 
directors may have a potentially counterproductive 
outcome. Haslem has argued that there is little 
evidence that independent directors have changed 
fund fiduciary behaviour, and that instead the 
consequence of the gap between reality and 
promise has been the creation of “cover for [the] 
self-interested behaviour of fund advisors.”
Furthermore, as noted earlier and detailed in 
Section 3.3.1, the empirical research paints a much 
more complex picture, with existing corporate 
governance research providing mixed evidence for 
claims of better performance. One clear conclusion 
from the empirical evidence is that independence 
is not a panacea for corporate governance, and 
indeed, may not even be the most important policy 
reform to pursue.
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3.3.1 Conflicting results over the  
value of independent directors  
in corporate governance
International research on 296 financial firms 
in 30 countries found that those with more 
independent directors experienced the worst 
returns in the 2007-8 financial crisis.  
Following mandatory changes in the 
composition of United States company boards 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a 2013 study 
found that companies with majority independent 
directors increased their turnover of poorly 
performing CEOs, leading to improved firm 
performance.
In contrast, a study into the 2003 change to the 
ASX’s listing rules requiring boards to adopt a 
majority of independent directors or “if not, why 
not”, concluded that companies with a majority 
of independent directors were less likely to 
replace poorly performing CEOs, and in addition 
were more likely to demand higher remuneration 
fees for decreased firm performance. Ultimately, 
these consequences of independence resulted 
in an estimated loss of $69 billion between 2003 
and 2011.
Further compounding these mixed results, 
a 2012 study of all Australian publicly listed 
companies found that as the numbers of 
independent directors on a board increase, 
the company performance measured by both 
accounting and market-based measures 
diminishes. Nevertheless, the study’s conclusion 
was that some independence could provide 
greater levels of oversight, making it even more 
unclear whether independence is valuable, and 
how much so if answered in the affirmative.
Finally, on the basis of their research on 969 
companies in Australia between 2003 and 
2011, Fischer and Swan criticised the ASX 
requirements that a majority of directors on listed 
company boards be ‘independent’ arguing that: 
Independent directors by definition have 
either no prior experience with the firm, or at 
least no recent experience. Moreover many 
are professional directors with no specific 
knowledge or background in the industry and 
their part-time nature means that acquisition of 
such information is difficult and is never likely to 
be comparable to that of full-time executives. 
Quite simply, they are not as good, and 
shareholders suffer as a result’.
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Such contradictory conclusions mean that the 
goal, which the federal government’s Discussion 
Paper recently announced, of creating a stable and 
efficient superannuation system that best serves 
members’ interests may not be achieved as a result 
of increased numbers of independent directors on 
superannuation boards. Indeed, a 2006 review of 
research on the relationship between chair or board 
independence in the US mutual fund industry, 
undertaken by the Office of Economic Analysis of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission reached 
the following conclusion:
…there is no consistent evidence 
that chair or board independence 
is associated with lower fees and/or 
higher returns for fund shareholders 
in the cross section.
It bears noting that the US mutual fund industry 
is many ways an analogue to the retail fund 
management industry in Australia. 
Ultimately, it appears that although independence 
may bring benefits to some boards lacking diversity 
or appropriate separation from management 
or company interests, the main effect of such a 
response is to create an illusion of independence. 
There is little indication that such perceptions in 
any way reflect the reality of boards, and as such 
independence alone is unlikely to materially address 
the dual challenges of diversity and conflict of 
interest that boards must manage.
Indeed, we suggest that there are two very simple 
reasons why increasing the number of independent 
directors may not in and of itself resolve the 
problems of corporate governance. As mentioned 
above, the two key ways corporate governance 
attempts to discipline boards are market 
governance (the purchase and sale of company 
stock), and representative board governance. The 
purpose of increased independence is to bring a 
disinterested objectivity to the board, countering 
the potential dominance of insiders (whether 
a majority or not) who may not act in the best 
interests of all shareholders and facilitating the 
resolution of conflicts. However, the overriding 
challenge of corporate governance is to align the 
interests of the corporate board and management 
more generally, as closely as possible to those of 
the shareholders.
The central way corporate boards attempt to 
achieve such an alignment in internal governance 
processes is via representation, with board 
members elected by shareholders. Representation 
is without doubt the most powerful mechanism 
within corporate governance for aligning the 
interests of boards and shareholders, because 
having shareholders on the board helps to bring 
the interests of shareholders directly into the 
boardroom.  While there are recognised problems 
with representative models (including representative 
political models) or the protection of minority 
interests, representation is seen as critical to 
giving the majority of citizens, shareholders or fund 
members a voice.
3.4  An inability to find  
‘non-associated’ trustees
Although the Cooper Review’s non-associated 
trustee definition attempts to address the problems 
of independence that occur when the threshold 
is set too low, the need to be free of many 
current or former connections to the fund and 
other related parties means that there will be an 
extremely high threshold for directors to satisfy. 
Indeed, some observers have raised doubts that 
this broad definition can even be satisfied by most 
potential appointees currently available to join 
superannuation boards.
Exacerbating this issue is evidence suggesting a 
pre-existing lack of appointees that satisfy even the 
less stringent independence definitions.
A study of 122 ASX200 companies between 2004 
and 2007 found that only 10.2 per cent of non-
executive directors appointed in 2006-07 were 
‘new’ directors, while existing board members 
running for re-election received, on average, a 
96.2 per cent vote in their favour. Meanwhile, a 
2005 APRA Discussion Paper noted concerns 
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by a number of submissions of an inability to find 
new directors, and that doing so would come at 
the expense of knowledge and experience. The 
issues faced by ASX companies indicate some 
of the potential limitations of relying on a policy of 
independence to solve the problems of governance 
in the superannuation industry.
Ultimately, this report contends, the importance 
currently ascribed to independence in non-market 
governance is not reflective of the equivocal 
research into its ostensible benefits. It should be 
noted that some individual superannuation funds 
nevertheless contend that increased independence 
may be necessary for other reasons, one example 
being a means of expanding the pool of potential 
appointees for trustee boards where funds face 
difficulties recruiting from existing representative 
organisations.
Although we accept that reforming the SIS Act 
so that funds, for such purposes and at their 
discretion, can more easily appoint independent 
directors on their boards, we reiterate that any 
governance policy outcome arising from this 
Report should be one that improves the alignment 
between the board and fund members, rather than 
mandated independence requirements.
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It establishes that the descriptive categories of 
representative not-for-profit and appointed for-profit 
trustee fund types predict different fund governance 
structures and practices, and are therefore sensible 
categories for interrogating their influence on fund 
performance. 
The results support existing research which has 
consistently found that representative trustee 
governance imparts a significant positive impact 
on performance, compared with appointed trustee 
funds. The representative governance model is not 
a perfect system. For example, the Cooper Review 
suggested that the model may be vulnerable to the 
perception that individual trustees are answerable 
to or dictated to by the organisation that appointed 
them. However, the representational model remains 
diverse in appointment methods, the numbers of 
trustees and areas of governance. Remarkably 
despite this diversity of forms of representation, 
the common outcome of representation seems to 
be a closer alignment of trustees’ and members’ 
interests.
Thus, this report contends that, in spite of some 
shortcomings, representation is actually the 
model that most closely satisfies the objectives 
of meeting the best interests of members and 
maximising retirement incomes for Australians. 
As we show below, the evidence for this claim is 
strong - the not-for-profit representative trustee 
model has outperformed its for-profit appointed 
trustee competitors on virtually every important 
criteria of superannuation performance over a long 
period. Although there may be scope for further 
improvement of the representative governance 
model, it promotes higher levels of diversity among 
trustees, more effectively minimises conflicts 
of interest and, importantly, has continually 
outperformed the for-profit model over the past 
decade, generating higher net returns for fund 
members.
In order to support this claim, we now review 
the evidence on the relationship between the 
two main governance models and some of 
the performance objectives. This evidence is 
derived primarily from 2013 data supplied by the 
respected superannuation research and ratings 
firm Rainmaker Information, and from a governance 
survey undertaken by APRA.
4.1  Ability to minimise conflicts 
of interest and act in 
members’ best interests
As the Cooper Review, and the federal 
government’s 2013 Discussion Paper, have noted, 
a key concern of corporate governance research 
and policy is attempting to maximise the alignment 
of agents charged with managing other people’s 
money and those who invest or deposit that money 
in trust. To put it another way, the objective of 
4. Fund governance – 
structures, practices, 
performance
This section analyses data on the fund governance and performance of 
Australia’s superannuation system and the relationships between them.
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corporate governance is to minimise the potential 
and actual conflicts of interest between investors 
and the corporate managers of that money. This 
principle applies equally to fund governance.
In the words of John Bogle, former CEO of the 
Vanguard Group, managing conflict “is a matter 
of fiduciary principle, as no man can serve two 
masters.” What Bogle means here is that a crucial 
issue for fund governance is that trustees have 
only one responsibility – to act in the best interests 
of fund members. John Bogle has been a long-
term critic of US mutual funds which he feels are 
conflicted between selling products to maximise 
the fees and profits of the financial institution 
running the fund, and delivering the best returns to 
the fund member/investor. He feels that too many 
mutual funds deliver for the shareholders, not for 
their fund members. Nevertheless, minimising and 
managing conflicts of interest will almost certainly 
be a permanent challenge for corporate and fund 
governance policymakers. Accordingly, the modern 
response to this issue is to structure governance 
processes to minimise conflict as much as 
possible, and then use disclosure to appropriately 
manage such issues that remain.
One of the current problems in examining fund 
governance is that we have few statistics and 
studies that enable us compare funds. The next 
part of this section presents results from an APRA 
survey of trustee structures and behaviours, 
which to the authors’ knowledge is the most 
comprehensive survey currently available. 
As Figure 4.1.1 shows, there is a significant 
difference in the structure of trust boards in terms 
of the primary employer of the trustee. Less 
than 5 per cent of trustees in public sector and 
industry funds are employed by the fund or a 
fund service provider, whereas in retail funds the 
employment relationship rises to almost 60 per 
cent of trustees. Figure 4.1.1 shows that 57.8 per 
cent of Retail directors, or almost three out of every 
five, are employed by one of these two types of 
organisations, compared to 3.3 per cent of Public 
Sector fund directors and 3.8 per cent of Industry 
fund directors. Corporate funds, with 19.2 per cent 
of their directors employed by the fund or fund 
service provider, are three times less likely than 
Retail funds to suffer from this potential conflict of 
interest.
FIGURE 4.1.1   PRIMARY EMPLOYER OF DIRECTOR
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Another indicator of differences in fund governance 
patterns concerns the number of other fund 
trustee/directorships held. Fig 4.1.2. shows that 
the majority of directors of not-for-profit funds 
hold relatively few additional trusteeships outside 
the fund to which they are a trustee. In particular, 
directors of industry and corporate funds are 
over four times more likely than Retail funds to 
hold no additional directorships at all. Conversely, 
compared to industry and corporate funds, retail 
fund directors are six times more likely to hold more 
than 15 directorships.
The issue of potentially conflicted relations between 
trustees and the organisations running or providing 
services to the fund (ie links that might affect 
governance) has a number of potential dimensions. 
Figure 4.1.3 shows that over a third of retail funds’ 
service providers are either the trustees’ parent 
company or share a common parent company, 
compared with 0.3 per cent of industry funds’ 
service providers.
One possible way of minimising potential structural 
conflicts of interest is to ensure trustees have 
their own superannuation savings in the fund – 
to have what North Americans term ‘skin in the 
game’. Although not a cure-all for the problem of 
conflict, the understanding that a trustee-directors’ 
retirement savings will be affected by the strategic 
decisions they make is thought more likely to 
temper potentially conflicted decision-making. 
There is indeed empirical evidence that skin in 
the game does predict better performance. For 
instance, Macquarie Equities recently reported 
its findings on the performance of the boards of 
Australia’s top 100 companies over five years from 
2008 to 2013. It found that companies whose 
directors held stock had better shareholder returns 
and return on equity. The return on equity was  
13.7 per cent higher and relative share price was  
8 per cent higher. 
Also, supporting the argument that ‘skin in the 
game matters’ is research by Cremers et al (2009) 
at the Yale Institute of Finance on the performance 
of mutual funds which found that funds without 
substantial personal investment of the directors 
significantly underperform. 
FIGURE 4.1.2   NUMBER OF OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS CURRENTLY HELD
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FIGURE 4.1.3   SERVICE PROVIDER RELATIONSHIP TO FUND
FIGURE 4.1.4   PERCENTAGE OF DIRECTORS INVESTED IN FUND THEY MANAGE
As Figure 4.1.4 shows, representative governance 
trustees are substantially more likely to be invested 
in the fund they manage than appointed trustee 
directors. Notably, almost 80 per cent of retail 
directors invest none of their superannuation 
contributions in the funds they manage, compared 
to between 28-38 per cent for not-for-profit 
trustees. In contrast, between 36-58 per cent of 
not-for-profit trustees invest all their superannuation 
in the funds they run, compared to 9 per cent of 
Retail funds. The absence of appointed trustee 
director’s having substantial skin in the game 
seems therefore to exert a reinforcing rather than 
a moderating effect on the problem of conflict of 
interest between their employers and the fund 
members.
32 T H E  M C K E L L  I N S T I T U T E
From Figure 4.1.5, we can also see that there is a significant difference in the probability that family members of 
trustees are invested in the fund. The logic here is that one would expect that having your own and other family 
members’ retirement savings in a fund would provide considerable motivation to a trustee in ensuring the fund 
operates in members’ best interests.
FIGURE 4.1.5   NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS ALSO INVESTED IN THIS FUND
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Another set of attributes about fund governance go to the practices and behaviours of fund boards. Figures 4.1.6 
and 4.1.7 present estimates of estimates of director/trustee hours spent per year on fund matters. They show 
that fund governance-type seems to predict quite different estimates of average hours spent in total and outside 
of board meetings.  Here we are simply establishing that we can see quite distinct structures and patterns of 
behaviour which form around fund governance types.
FIGURE 4.1.6   AVERAGE NUMBER OF DIRECTOR HOURS SPENT PER FUND PER YEAR
FIGURE 4.1.7    
NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT BY TRUSTEE/DIRECTOR PER YEAR ON FUND MATTERS OUTSIDE BOARD MEETINGS
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This section has presented evidence that there are 
several grounds for thinking that prima facie there 
are different ways conflicts of interest are structured 
and managed in different fund governance 
structures in superannuation. However, it must 
be emphasised that the myriad relationships that 
superannuation trustees and directors may manage 
while sitting on fund boards do not necessarily 
automatically give rise to actual conflict of interest. 
As argued by respondents to the Cooper Review, 
the majority of trustees understand the need to 
represent all members of a fund rather than a single 
stakeholder or class of fund member.
Although managing conflict of interest will continue 
to be a challenge for all funds, the evidence 
shows that for representative governance not-for-
profit directors have more diverse backgrounds, 
hold fewer additional directorships, have less 
direct relationships to the fund or related service 
providers, invest more of their retirement savings 
and time in the fund they represent. Such actions 
indicate a different ability to manage existing 
conflict of interest and act in the interest of the 
fund’s members than those trustee/directors 
in appointed for-profit counterparts. Below we 
use these differences as the basis of a test of 
whether they seem to translate into different fund 
performance.
4.2  Levels of diversity
Diversity is increasingly acknowledged as important 
to effective governance by a wide range of sources. 
The common argument in its favour is that diversity 
helps reduce the possibility of myopic ‘group-think’ 
that limits the ability of boards to make effective 
strategic decisions in face of a host of competing 
and conflicting priorities.
Although this paper does not suggest that existing 
levels of diversity within the superannuation 
sector are ideal and cannot or should not be 
improved, the evidence demonstrates that, 
compared to retail funds, industry, public sector 
and corporate superannuation boards have higher 
levels of diversity. Greater diversity seems strongly 
associated with the structure of the representation 
model. 
As shown by Fig 4.2.1 below, a majority of Retail 
directors are employed either by the current fund 
(25.2 per cent) or the fund’s service provider (32.6 
per cent), with only a small proportion of directors 
representing other defined interest groups. In 
contrast, not-for-profit fund trustees – Industry 
and Public Sector types in particular – tend to 
have more widely dispersed sources, notably from 
employer groups and industry unions.
FIGURE 4.2.1   EMPLOYER OF TRUSTEES/DIRECTORS ON SUPERANNUATION BOARDS
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FIGURE 4.2.2   TYPES OF BOARD REPRESENTATION
A similar finding occurs when reviewing the various types of board representation (Fig 4.2.2) and it is evident that 
the pools from which representative governance funds are able to draw their trustees provides greater diversity to 
their boards compared to the appointed trustee retail funds.
Importantly, directors of not-for-profit funds tend 
to be appointed from sources external to the fund 
significantly more often than for-profit funds, which 
overwhelmingly appoint directors from internal 
sources (Fig 4.2.3). 
It does not necessarily follow from this observation 
that appointed for-profit funds should alter their 
governance systems to emulate their representative 
trustee counterparts, or that individual not-for-
profit funds must be prohibited from appointing 
independent directors according to individual fund 
discretion. As stated in section 3, there may be 
other reasons for independence that justify a fund 
attempting to recruit more independent trustees, 
and overly prescriptive laws and regulations against 
independence may prove as problematic as laws 
and regulations for mandated independence. 
However, if the absence of diversity and 
representation are factors that can be shown to be 
associated with significantly poorer performance, 
then some remedy may be required within retail 
fund governance.   
It seems hard to contest the claim that the ability 
of not-for-profit funds to appoint trustees from 
more diverse backgrounds stems directly from 
their representative governance model, which 
limits excessive appointment of individuals from 
one particular group of ‘insiders’ and prescribes 
minimum numbers of appointees from different 
backgrounds. Accordingly, using independence to 
minimise potential conflicts of interest is likely to 
result in little meaningful improvement in this regard.
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FIGURE 4.2.3   METHOD OF BOARD APPOINTMENT
4.3  Governance and 
performance – the evidence
Diversity, minimising conflicts of interest (both 
potential and actual) and policies for ensuring that 
fund trustee-directors act in the best interests of 
their members count for little should members’ 
retirement savings be invested poorly. In fact, the 
overarching aim of these attributes is to maximise 
the performance of the fund for members, with the 
core performance metric being the long-term net 
returns for members. In maximising performance, 
the fund aims not only at providing ample finances 
for each individual’s retirement, but to also allows 
this important pillar of Australia’s retirement system 
to remain viable in the long-term.
As explained in Section 2, superannuation 
is a complex sector, with issues of member 
compulsion, fund and asset size, fees and a quasi-
public-private industry structure  all contributing 
in some fashion to long-term performance. As 
such, many of the corporate governance concepts 
proposed as means of improving superannuation 
governance – independence being the primary 
example in this Report – are not guaranteed to 
translate into better industry performance, even if 
one disregards the contested nature of many of 
these concepts in other settings.
Despite these caveats, the available evidence 
does show clear causal relationship between 
not-for-profit representative governance funds, 
and higher levels of returns for members. Many 
types of empirical testing has been undertaken on 
superannuation performance in Australia, some 
using raw returns, others attempting to see if 
adjusting for risk would change the results of the 
simple compounding tests. Both raw and risk-
adjusted research supports the proposition that 
the two governance models produce significantly 
different performance outcomes.
Previous research has broadly concluded that, 
compared to for-profit performance, not-for-profit 
superannuation funds (i.e. Corporate, Industry and 
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Public Sector) have consistently generated higher 
returns for their members, up to 2.4 per cent per 
annum higher on a risk-adjusted basis. Industry 
Super Australia recently affirmed this finding, 
concluding that had all superannuation funds 
returned the not-for-profit funds’ 5.7 per cent long-
term annual average, Australian retirement savings 
would be $88 billion higher than it currently stands.
The most recent rate of return (ROR) data from 
APRA indicates the superior performance of not 
for-profit funds, such that between 2003-04 and 
2012-13, not-for-profit funds have outperformed 
their for-profit counterparts between 0.5 and  
3.2 per cent per year.
In order to bring this previous research together 
and provide a more pragmatic illustration of the 
importance of strong performance, this paper 
analyses actual crediting rate data from Rainmaker 
Information for balanced and default funds 
between 1987-88 and 2012-13, and provides 
two scenarios to illustrate the long-term effects of 
fund performance of representative and appointed 
trustee funds.
Figure 4.3.1 presents the Rainmaker annual 
crediting rate data by fund type 1987/8 to 2012/3. 
It shows that across that time period, in upswings 
and downturns in asset markets, not-for profit 
funds have outperformed the for profit funds. 
Across that 25 year period the difference in average 
returns is about 1.84 per cent per year.
FIGURE 4.3.1   RATES OF RETURN PERCENTAGE BY MARKET SEGMENT 1988-2013
6.61%
8.45%
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In order to test for time specific nature of the returns, Figures 4.3.2 and 4.2.3 attempt to decompose the returns 
across the entire period. Figure 4.3.2 shows that in the first half of the period when average returns for both fund 
types were quite high, NFP funds out-performed by about 1.8 per cent per annum. In the second half of the 
period, when average returns for both funds was lower, the difference between fund types actually increased 
slightly to about 1.9 per cent per annum. Across both halves of the period not-for profit funds outperformed.
FIGURE 4.3.2   SECTOR PERFORMANCE AVERAGES FROM 1987 – 1999, 2000 – 2013 & 1987-2013
FIGURE 4.3.3   PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCE – NFP V FP SUPERANNUATION FUNDS, YEARLY 
DIFFERENCE AND FITTED TREND LINE
Figure 4.3.3 shows the annual differences in fund returns and a smoothed trend line of those differences across 
the sample period. Here again we see a reinforcement of that consistent outperformance.
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However, a question emerges about how these 
performance differences translate into retirement 
savings. In the next step we established two 
scenarios and the results of different returns 
performance are presented in the next series of charts 
The first two graphs (Figures 4.3.4 and 4.3.5) present 
the results of Scenario 1 which uses the Rainmaker 
fund performance data and assumes an initial $1000 
investment in a fund at the beginning of the 1987-88 
financial year, with only the fund type crediting rate 
added annually and compounded. It shows that the 
compounded effect of the crediting rate difference 
here can be seen as the difference in the final 
amounts accumulated between for profit ($4967.63) 
and not for profit funds ($7774.01). The difference in 
accumulated amount is $2806.36, so that over the 
twenty five years of not-for-profit funds accumulated 
36% more than their for profit counterparts.
This scenario is representative of an individual who no 
longer contributes to their superannuation and relies 
solely on the fund’s performance for wealth growth. It 
also highlights the effect of the compounded effect of 
the fund return differential. 
FIGURE 4.3.4   SCENARIO 1: INITIAL INVESTMENT OF $1000 IN 1987,  
ANNUAL CREDITING RATES COMPOUNDED, BALANCED & DEFAULT FUNDS - 1988 TO 2013
FIGURE 4.3.5   SCENARIO 1: INITIAL INVESTMENT OF $1000 IN 1987,  
ANNUAL CREDITING RATES COMPOUNDED, BALANCED & DEFAULT FUNDS - 1988 TO 2013  
DIFFERENCES IN DOLLAR AMOUNT AND PERCENT
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FIGURE 4.3.6   SCENARIO 2: INITIAL INVESTMENT OF $1000 IN 1987 PLUS ADDITIONAL $1000 PER ANNUM, 
ANNUAL CREDITING RATES COMPOUNDED, BALANCED & DEFAULT FUNDS - 1988 TO 2013
FIGURE 4.3.7   SCENARIO 2: INITIAL INVESTMENT OF $1000 IN 1987 PLUS ADDITIONAL $1000 PER ANNUM, 
ANNUAL CREDITING RATES COMPOUNDED, BALANCED & DEFAULT FUNDS - 1988 TO 2013 
DIFFERENCES IN DOLLAR AMOUNT AND PERCENT
The second scenario (illustrated in Figures 4.3.6 and 
4.3.7) also begins with an initial $1000 investment, 
but an additional $1000 per annum is also contributed 
to the balance. As per Figures 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, the 
crediting rate is then added and compounded annually. 
It shows that over the 25 year period of the Rainmaker 
fund crediting rate data, this scenario would see the 
difference in crediting rate result in a not for profit 
member saving accumulating $76,444.02 while the 
for profit fund member would have accumulated  
$57,981.75. The difference amounts to $18,462.27 
or 24 per cent  more for a not for profit fund member 
compared to a for profit member.      
These two scenarios act as proxies for two basic types 
of fund member – Scenario 1 depicts retired individuals 
who no longer contribute to their funds, while Scenario 2 
depicts working individuals still in the accumulation phase 
of their superannuation life-cycle and therefore continuing 
to make superannuation contributions.
As shown in both graphs below, not-for-profit balanced/
default funds have consistently and significantly delivered 
better results for fund members during the 26-year 
sample period.
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Another way to illustrate the difference in 
performance between fund types is to ask how 
much longer a fund member would have to work, 
wait and contribute in a lower performing fund type 
in order to reach the amount of the better performing 
fund. There is currently a lot of debate about the 
retirement age with some people suggesting that 
superannuation fund members will not have enough 
to retire on by the time they are 65 or 67.
Figure 4.3.8 illustrates the Scenario 1 in terms of time 
difference and Figure 4.3.9 illustrates the time effects 
of Scenario 2.
In Scenario 1 a member in a not for profit fund would 
reach for profit final amount 8 years earlier.  
In Scenario 2 a member of a not for profit fund would 
reach the for profit final total 6 years earlier.
In other words, if the benchmark for retirement 
savings is set at the for profit performance standard, 
a not for profit fund member would reach that 
benchmark between 6 and 8 years earlier.
FIGURE 4.3.8   SCENARIO 1: INITIAL $1000 LUMP SUM PLUS CREDITING RATES COMPOUNDED, 1987-2013
FIGURE 4.3.9   SCENARIO 2: INITIAL $1000 + $1000 YEARLY  PLUS CREDITING RATES FROM 1987-2013
10
-11
11-12
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FIGURE 4.3.10   SCENARIO 1: INITIAL $1000 LUMP SUM OVER 50 YEARS USING AVERAGE CREDITING 
RATES FROM 1987-2013
FIGURE 4.3.11   SCENARIO 2: INITIAL $1000 PLUS ADDITIONAL $1000 PER ANNUM OVER 50 YEARS USING 
AVERAGE CREDITING RATES FROM 1987-2013
We should stress, that this scenario relies on actual 
crediting rate data over a 26-year time period. 
This period was chosen for the simple reason 
that this was the longest credible data available. 
However, a typical working life will be much longer 
than this, and in order to illustrate the effect of 
such a performance difference over a typical 
working life, we used Scenarios 1 and 2 again, 
but this time over a 50 year time period, using the 
average crediting rate for each fund type from the 
Rainmaker 26 year actuals. 
Essentially, the compounded effects of 
outperformance over an even longer period magnify 
the scale of the existing difference, and make 
even starker the effect of that outperformance on 
retirement living standards.
Figures 4.3.10 and 4.3.1 illustrate these scenarios. 
They show that the additional time period magnifies 
both the dollar and time differences that are 
produced by the outperformance of not-for-profit 
funds over for-profit counterparts.
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It may be contended that the greater diversity 
of investment options offered by many for-profit 
funds demonstrate that the for-profit model 
can bring greater returns to the members who 
actively choose such investment options. Such an 
assertion disregards the fact that the vast majority 
of Australian superannuation fund members 
are ‘reluctant investors’, either uninterested in 
managing their ‘super’ or lacking the financial 
literacy skills necessary to properly understand 
performance and act to reward better performing 
funds. This structural fact was the reason for 
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the introduction of MySuper. While some fund 
members undoubtedly will switch, most fund 
members are not interested or skilled enough to 
manage their superannuation.
Ultimately, the implications drawn from the data 
presented in this report support the results from 
the empirical literature on the relationship between 
governance and performance. We contend 
that there is a strong and sustained association 
between the representative governance model and 
enhanced performance.
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This raises the question: when a system is 
working better than the alternative why tamper 
with it? Indeed, if one system has so consistently 
outperformed another, why don’t we focus 
attention on the underperformer?
Nonetheless, with the objective of continuous 
improvement, there are strategies which research 
suggests could contribute substantially to improved 
performance of all forms of superannuation fund, 
some of which involve regulatory initiatives and 
others good management practice. These include 
increasing the competence of directors through 
training and experience, renewing the focus on 
board culture, and focusing on development of 
robust risk management systems. We examine 
each of these recommendations in turn below.
5.1. Increase competence 
through training and 
experience
A shift in policy focus from independence towards 
competence has been occurring in corporate 
governance in the last ten years. For instance, in 
the United Kingdom, following the global financial 
crisis, the 2009 Walker Review held the following 
for improving corporate governance:
The most critical need is for an environment 
in which effective challenge of the executive is 
expected and achieved in the boardroom before 
decisions are taken on major risk and strategic 
issues. For this to be achieved will require close 
attention to board composition to ensure the 
right mix of both financial industry capability and 
critical perspective from high-level experience 
in other major business. It will also require a 
materially increased time commitment from the 
[non-executive director] group on the board overall 
for which a combination of financial industry 
experience and independence of mind will be 
much more relevant than a combination of lesser 
experience and formal independence. [emphasis 
added]
Le Mire and Gilligan have noted that this highlights 
the importance of expertise over satisfaction of the 
formal independence criteria. Importantly, another 
study concluded that the number of independent 
directors was not as important as how ‘active’ the 
independent directors are on the board. According 
to Wheeler:
Independent directors must be able to display an 
awareness of how business works and be able 
to assimilate quickly information about how the 
particular business works. They need to be able 
to understand the dynamics between individual 
5 What can be done to improve 
governance in practice? 
Alternatives to independence
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that, not only will the appointment 
of independent directors to the boards of superannuation funds fail to 
improve performance of not-for-profit funds, it is highly likely to reduce their 
performance.
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executive directors and those between executive 
directors and their own non-executive group. 
They need to understand how individual strategic 
decisions will impact on share price and how 
strategy is formulated within the organisation and 
then packaged to those outside the organisation. 
… These requirements raise the question of 
whether industry specific knowledge is something 
that needs to be weighed against structural 
independence and favoured over it.
The clear lesson from these views is that 
independence means little unless directors have 
appropriate experience to perform their duties. 
This means that greater effort must be made to 
improve training of trustees on superannuation fund 
boards, and better promotion of ‘active’ learning in 
order to gain practical experience for the benefit of 
members.
Based on a study of 400 people involved in the 
superannuation industry in 2007 and industry 
representatives from 22 funds, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants/Deloittes, reported a 
large interest in qualifications-based training for 
participants. At that time, the study noted that most 
training in the industry was optional, and that the 
most common form of compulsory training was 
bespoke, and organised specifically for particular 
boards. The study reported that 49 percent of 
surveyed funds offered tailored training, which 
included between 5-20 hours each year. 
In 2010, The OECD identified that two areas 
needing improvement in corporate governance 
including ensuring appropriate board skills and 
experience and promoting competence on boards. 
Awareness of this has been growing in recent 
years. As the Australian Institute of Superannuation 
Trustees recently observed:
the fundamental criteria in respect to the suitability 
and competence of any trustee director should 
lie in their skills and knowledge, their commitment 
and dedication to a process of continuous learning 
and a deep understanding of the members, the 
membership demographics and the members’ 
needs.
In Australia, a range of industry bodies have 
expanded their member services into training and 
development, providing both custom-made and 
general courses to build directors’ and trustee 
directors’ skills. These include the Australian 
Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, and Financial 
Services Council. Training in directors’ duties and 
responsibilities, skills and knowledge pertaining 
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to investment, risk, and financial management 
generally should be a part of onboarding, as 
well a commitment to continuous learning as 
required. Evaluating the outcomes of such training 
would provide useful data for current debates on 
governance.
5.2. Renewed focus on culture  
of ‘honesty’
As Clarke and Dean argued, the ‘fuzzy notion’ of 
independence has clouded the core concept lying 
at the heart of governance reform – honesty. This 
simple concept is ultimately what any governance 
reforms should aim to achieve, whereby directors 
act in good faith for the benefit of members, and 
are open and transparent about decisions that 
may result in a conflict of interest. This requires 
the building of a governance culture with a 
strong ethical foundation, one which promotes 
a healthy management culture throughout the 
superannuation fund.
Independence is a means to the end of promoting 
greater competency and accountability on company 
boards, with greater ability to install directors with 
the talent and diversity necessary to adjust to the 
ceaseless change inherent in both domestic and 
global economies. Honesty – supported by strong 
enforcement – places both the strengths and 
weaknesses of a board out in the open, forcing 
companies which suffer from shortcomings to reform 
and improve in the long run.
However, simply labelling a particular individual 
‘independent’ does not encourage practical 
changes that improve governance. Such 
a cosmetic change might give the market 
confidence that a board has sufficient diversity and 
transparency that could improve performance, 
but simply stating that a person is independent 
does not in any way change their behaviour. In 
short, independence may contribute to honesty 
in governance, but it cannot do so alone, and 
if such a path is taken then there is a risk that 
complacency will occur, at least until the next big 
company declares insolvency. As the AIST and 
Industry Funds Forum argued in 2012, trustee 
directors need to develop and support cultures 
which foster accountability, integrity, transparency, 
effective disclosure and communication. 
5.3.  Robust risk management 
systems
While the Cooper Review and the federal 
government’s recent Discussion Paper are 
silent on risk management, other commentators 
on superannuation fund governance note 
the importance of trustee directors pursuing 
comprehensive risk management policies and 
practices. Directors are operating in increasingly 
complex legal and financial environments and 
failure to attend to risks can lead not only to 
extensive liability, but also disastrous consequences 
for fund members. 
In his study of banks and the global financial 
crisis, Hopt observes that many risks had been 
neglected, underestimate or, particularly in the 
case of systemic risks, not understood or taken 
into consideration at all. In 2006, the word ‘risk’ 
did not appear in one of the eight principles of 
good corporate governance of banks published by 
the Basel Committee, which is the primary global 
standard-setter for prudential regulation of banks, 
but by 2010, ‘risk’ was mentioned in nine of its 
now fourteen principles. Hopt cautions that risk can 
never be eliminated, particularly as it is a core part 
of the business of financial institutions. However, 
as Clare said in relation to superannuation funds, 
‘avoidance of some risks brings about avoidance 
of substantial potential benefits as well’. Thus, 
the objective should be to know, understand and 
manage those risks.
For superannuation funds, this involves establishing 
a robust risk management strategy and plan, 
implementing internal controls to operationalise the 
strategy, and evaluating the effectiveness of the 
strategy and internal controls. Under the registrable 
superannuation funds (RSE) licensing scheme, 
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registrable funds are already subject to an APRA 
standard to have in place a risk management 
framework which includes systems for identifying, 
assessing, managing, mitigating and monitoring 
material risks that may affect its ability to meet its 
obligations to beneficiaries. Research indicates 
that while most funds now have comprehensive 
risk management plans, strategic risks may still 
be overlooked and boards may not understand 
completely risk management principles or ensure 
satisfactory outcomes. 
Clare has argued that in terms of the traditional 
risks associated with superannuation funds – 
investment risks, operational risks, and even 
systemic risks, regulatory requirements in Australia, 
for the most part, have been effective. However, 
superannuation funds are less effective in dealing 
with some other risks. Among these, Clare 
includes:
the financial risks of longevity in retirement, the 
adequacy of retirement income more generally, 
reputational risks for superannuation funds 
(including in regard to non-core features or 
operations of funds, and the possible risks 
of climate change and emissions trading 
arrangements. Political and regulatory risks can 
also be challenging for a regulated entity to deal 
with, as in some instances regulation is the problem 
rather than the answer.
These are emerging issues – which come under 
the umbrella of sustainability issues – that will 
become more challenging in the future and require 
considerable strategic consideration. Some industry 
organisations, such as the AIST/IFF have noted 
the need for superannuation funds to consider 
environmental, social and corporate governance 
risks of their own operational activities as well as 
their own investment processes. The silence on this 
topic in recent government discussion represents a 
missed opportunity.
Reflecting on risks in superannuation and returning 
to the topic at hand, Besley and Pratt consider 
the different risk allocations between defined 
contribution and defined benefit plans, and the 
governance implications of these different risk 
allocations. In defined contribution plans greater 
risk is borne by the fund member. They also note 
that pension fund contracts (between members 
and the fund) tend to be incomplete (because it 
is difficult for fund members to completely bind 
fund managers to deliver exactly on any promise). 
They note that in such a world of incomplete 
fund contracting in defined contribution funds it is 
necessary for the fund member to be more vigilant, 
and they must rely more on trustees to ensure 
that the fund operates in their interests (compared 
to a defined benefit fund). In this sort of situation, 
which closely approximates Australia’s compulsory 
superannuation system, they claim that the key 
agent for vigilance are fund trustees. And they 
recommend that the sort of trustee required to 
exercise such vigilance is what they term the 
“caring layman driven by a stake in the fund”.   
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This is because of the sector’s unique attributes – 
namely, a majority of fund members characterised 
as ‘conscripted’ or ‘reluctant’ investors, who do not 
have the interest or financial acumen necessary for 
market governance to play a significant role. These 
constraints on the role of market governance are 
exacerbated in an industry that typically competes 
for funds under management and market share 
rather than performance and price.
However, we demonstrated that increasing the 
proportion of independent trustee-directors is unlikely 
to bring about increased levels of diversity, lower 
levels of potential and actual conflicts of interest, 
and improved fund performance for the benefit of 
members. Conversely, introducing non-associated 
trustee-directors as per the Cooper Review’s 
recommendations is likely to exacerbate existing 
issues surrounding a lack of suitable trustees.
We found that the representative trustee 
governance structure has produced significantly 
better returns for fund members over a long 
period, compared to appointed trustee governance 
funds. We showed that the effect of this better 
performance can be measured in terms of a larger 
pool of superannuation savings on which to retire, 
or in terms of the number of years extra a person 
in a retail fund would have to work to attain the 
savings amount of a representative trustee fund.  
In both cases, the differences are stark.
The representative governance model is not a 
perfect system by any measure, and this applies in 
politics, corporate and fund governance. It is just 
that it is better than any other system that has so 
far been devised. For example, the Cooper Review 
noted that the model does not necessarily achieve 
its original purpose of ensuring both employee 
and employers in a single-employer defined fund 
were given legitimate opportunity to operate a 
fund, and also suggested that the model may be 
vulnerable to the perception that individual trustees 
are answerable to or dictated to by the organisation 
that appointed them. However, the representative 
model remains diverse in appointment methods, 
the numbers of trustees and areas of governance. 
Remarkably, despite the diversity of forms 
of representation across the representative 
governance funds, the common outcome of 
representation seems to be a closer alignment of 
trustees’ and members’ interests.
This report concludes that, in spite of some 
shortcomings, representation is actually the 
model that most closely satisfies the objectives 
of meeting the best interests of members and 
maximising retirement incomes for Australians. The 
evidence for this claim is strong – the not-for-profit 
representative trustee model has outperformed its 
for-profit appointed trustee competitors on virtually 
every important criteria of superannuation 
6 Conclusion
This Report has argued the internal (non-market) governance of 
superannuation funds in Australia is a reform area likely to have 
a substantial impact upon the long-term performance of the 
superannuation sector.
51
THE
McKell
Institute
The Success of 
Representative Governance 
on Superannuation Boards
performance over a long period. Although there 
may be scope for further improvement of the 
representative governance model, it promotes 
higher levels of diversity amongst trustees, more 
effectively minimises conflicts of interest, and, 
importantly, has continually outperformed the  
for-profit model over more than the past two 
decades, generating substantially higher net  
returns for fund members.
Instead of implementing reforms based on the 
promise (which in turn is based on an uncertain 
premise) that independence leads to benefits 
for funds and members alike, this paper argues 
that the existing not-for-profit representative 
governance model already promotes higher 
levels of diversity and more effectively minimises 
conflicts of interest in comparison to the for-profit 
governance model.
While representative governance may not 
be the only factor allowing not-for-profit 
funds to perform better than their for-profit 
counterparts, the success of this governance 
model nevertheless indicates that mandated 
independence is unnecessary to give fund 
members appropriate levels of retirement 
income. Alternatively, increasing levels of director 
competence, renewing the focus on honesty, 
and implementing more robust risk management 
systems would positively benefit governance of 
superannuation funds.
Indeed, if there is one lesson that can be 
learned from an evidence-based approach to 
superannuation governance, it is not the role 
of independent directors to protect minority 
shareholders. Rather, the lesson is that 
representative governance is a decisive factor 
in closely aligning the interests of those who are 
charged with managing funds with the majority 
of fund members. This raises the policy question: 
should any fund that wishes to secure access to 
the mandatory default superannuation savings 
of Australian workers not have to demonstrate it 
has a representative governance structure?
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